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The Dynamics of Performance Over the Duration of Major League Baseball Long-Term Contracts

DePaul University, akrautma{at}depaul.edu

John L. Solow

University of Iowa

We re-examine incentives in Major League Baseball contracts by considering performance over the duration of the contract. We consider both the incentive to perform in order to maximize the subsequent contract and the disincentive of a fixed salary. We isolate the effect of the latter by controlling for the probability that the contract is the player's last. We find that players who are less likely to sign a subsequent contract have a large and statistically significant reduction in performance compared to expectations. The incentive to perform well in anticipation of signing the next contract is equally large and offsetting so that players who expect to sign another contract largely perform to expectations.

Key Words: sports economics • baseball • incentives • long-term contracts • shirking

Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 10, No. 1, 6-22 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/1527002508327382


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