Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

CiteULike is a free service for managing and discovering scholarly references - click here to get started.

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
Journal of Sports Economics
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow Full Text (OnlineFirst PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via HighWire
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Roberts, G. R.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

The Case for Baseball's Special Antitrust Immunity

Gary R. Roberts

Tulane University

In this article, the author argues that if one assumes that the public interest equates with maximizing consumer utility, then baseball's historic judicially-created antitrust immunity is in the public interest. Despite Major League Baseball's natural monopoly market power, applying anticonspiracy principles to this inherently wholly-integrated business would produce a form of irrational, ad hoc regulation by judges and juries that would create inefficiency and uncertainty without on balance enhancing consumer welfare. For base-ball's minor leagues, applying antitrust laws would most likely lead to the elimination of many teams and the concentration of those remaining in fewer areas. Given that the minor league product is consumed by entire communities instead of only by those who buy tickets, this would significantly diminish consumer welfare. Thus, the public interest is best served by maintaining baseball's antitrust "exemption."

Key Words: antitrust • market power • economic power • public interest • Major League Baseball • minor leagues

Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 4, No. 4, 302-317 (2003)
DOI: 10.1177/1527002503257326
Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?


This article has been cited by other articles:


Home page
 Journal of Sports EconomicsHome page
S. F. Ross
Antitrust, Professional Sports, and the Public Interest
Journal of Sports Economics, November 1, 2003; 4(4): 318 - 331.
[Abstract] [PDF]