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Journal of Sports Economics
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Overtime Incentives in the National Hockey League (NHL)

More Evidence

Stephen Shmanske

California State University, East Bay

Franklin Lowenthal

California State University, East Bay

The National Hockey League (NHL) in 1999-2000 changed its rules for games that are tied at the end of regulation time. The old rules called for the team to be awarded two points for a win, one for a tie, and zero for a loss. The league felt that play was too conservative during overtime because teams feared losing the one point already earned. The new rules called for a team to retain its one point earned for tying in regulation even if it ultimately lost during the overtime. This change strengthens the importance of a subtle difference in incentives depending on whether one's opponent is from the same conference. Because playoff positions are determined only by intraconference rankings, losing in overtime to an out-of-conference opponent has no negative consequences. Alternatively, losing to an in-conference opponent could affect the ultimate playoff position of the team. The authors use multiple regression analysis of individual games during the 2002-2003 and 2003-2004 seasons to examine this subtle difference in incentives.

Key Words: economics of sports • NHL • overtime • incentives

Journal of Sports Economics, Vol. 8, No. 4, 435-442 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/1527002506292581
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