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The Performance-Enhancing Drug Game Reconsidered: A Fair Play Approach

LARGE, University of Strasbourg

^* To whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: nicolas.eber{at}urs.u-strasbg.fr.

	Abstract

In this article, the author incorporates fair play norms into the analysis of the basic performance-enhancing drug game proposed in 2004 by Haugen (in the Journal of Sports Economics). In some cases, it leads to a modification in the very nature of the game, switching it from a prisoner’s dilemma to a stag hunt game characterized by two pure-strategy equilibria: a risk-dominant doping equilibrium but also a payoff-dominant no-doping one. In such cases, the main problem for athletes becomes to coordinate their intentions and, hence, find a reliable coordinating device. The author suggests that some kind of preplay communication about doping and formal agreements through an antidoping charter may serve as such a device.

First published on December 21, 2007, doi:10.1177/1527002507308109

Journal of Sports Economics 2008;9:318.

A more recent version of this article appeared on June 1, 2008


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